As a jet ski sped from Jordan into Israeli waters near Eilat on the Red Sea in early June, much slower navy vessels raced to intercept the intruder. The incident set off a torrent of rumours speculating on the light-touch security in the southern city of approximately 56,000. Eilat is a diving and snorkelling holiday destination for Israelis and the gateway to the Sinai Desert. It’s a prized vacation spot.
Shortly after the jet-ski incident (the driver of the seacraft was turned back by Israeli naval patrols and detained by Jordanian navy officials), a report was leaked in the Israeli media, stating that David Zini, the head of Israel’s domestic security agency (the Shin Bet), had expressed concern in closed-door sessions that “the next October 7” could well happen in Eilat.
Eilat Security Concerns and Institutional Distrust
In the days following this report, unnamed sources attempted to mop up the mess by telling Israeli media that any suggestions that Eilat was an “exposed city” were “speculative” and based on questionable, if any, intelligence. The problem is that Israelis have little confidence in these institutional efforts to sweep away unhelpful facts. That is exactly what happened in the lead-up to October 7, now well-documented to have been the result of a total breakdown of Israel’s intelligence, military and political systems. Various offices — at the highest levels — had more than enough information to foresee an imminent attack by Hamas. Arrogance, delayed reactions and siloed functions all converged to create a massive blind spot along the border between Gaza and Israel.
Netanyahu's Refusal to Take Responsibility
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has steadfastly refused to take responsibility for October 7 and its aftermath. IDF and security leaders have stepped up and owned their failures, individually and as a collective. Quite a few have resigned from their positions. Meanwhile, there has been a steady flow of official reports, books and investigative reporting that has established unequivocally that there was no shortage of information regarding Hamas’s plans to attack. What Israel’s leaders failed to do was to assess, process and analyze the data with the speed and skill required. (A recently released book titled “06:29” — currently available only in Hebrew — by highly regarded military journalist Amos Harel documents the events of that day and key periods leading up to it, painstakingly.)
Israelis are not overly inclined to trust leadership these days. Little has changed in this country since October 6. The same coalition of extremists dominates the political echelon. IDF, Shin Bet and Mossad leadership have been replaced but one must question whether the entrenched, sclerotic institutional cultures have been modified at all.
